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Abstract
Family firms were widely recognized to have substantial contribution to economy
especially in emerging economies. However, some previous studies reveal that
family firms tend to be conservative and unwilling to take more risks. We ex-
tended the literature by investigating whether there was a difference in risk-
taking behavior between family and non-family firms in the context of Indone-
sia. Moreover, the presence of women in the top management also considered
negatively correlated with risk-taking strategy. Therefore, this study empiri-
cally examined the effects of family ownership and women in top management
on risk-taking strategy of firms. Using data of 336 publicly traded firms in Indo-
nesia over 2012-2016, this study confirmed the negative effect of family owner-
ship and women in top management on corporate risk-taking. Family owner-
ship and involvement as the CEO of the firms negatively associated with the
level of risk taking. Moreover, our results reveal that the presence of women was
matter more to decrease corporate risk-taking when they served in the board of
directors rather than in the board of commissioners.
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Abstrak
Bisnis keluarga memiliki kontribusi yang besar terhadap ekonomi terutama di negara-
negara berkembang. Tetapi, beberapa studi sebelumnya menyampaikan bahwa perusahaan-
perusahaan keluarga cenderung konservatif dan tidak bersedia untuk mengambil risiko
yang lebih. Kami memperluas literatur dengan menguji apakah ada perbedaan perilaku
pengambilan risiko antara perusahaan keluarga dan perusahaan non-keluarga dalam
konteks di Indonesia. Lebih lanjut, kehadiran perempuan di dalam manajemen puncak
juga dipertimbangkan memiliki hubungan negatif dengan strategi pengambilan risiko.
Oleh karena itu, studi ini secara empiris menguji pengaruh kepemilikan keluarga dan
kehadiran perempuan dalam manajemen puncak pada strategi pengambilan risiko
perusahaan. Menggunakan data 336 perusahaan publik di Indonesia selama periode
2012-2016, studi ini mengkonfirmasi pengaruh negatif dari kepemilikan keluarga dan
kehadiran perempuan di dalam manajemen puncak pada pengambilan risiko perusahaan.
Kepemilikan dan keterlibatan keluarga sebagai kepala eksekutif perusahaan berhubungan
negatif dengan tingkat pengambilan risiko. Lebih lanjut, hasil-hasil kami mengemukakan
bahwa kehadiran perempuan akan lebih menurunkan pengambilan risiko ketika mereka
berada di dewan direksi daripada di dewan komisaris.
Kata kunci: Kepemilikan Keluarga; Pengambilan Risiko; Perempuan dalam Manajemen
Puncak
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The family business is a business where a family
has relatively strong power in a firm and giving the
strategic direction through ownership or manage-
ment (Pieper, Klein, & Jaskiewicz, 2008). In Asia,
more than two-third firms are owned by individual
or family. In Western Europe, 44 percent of firms
are in control by families (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Such
kind of ownership concentration could have a dif-
ferent impact on firm value (Jiang & Peng, 2010).
Bhaumik & Gregoriou (2010) provide a comprehen-
sive review of agency problem with regards to fam-
ily firms. It is argued that type 1 agency problem
(shareholders and managers) should be minimized
in the family firms. However, on the other hand,
agency problem type 2 (majority-minority share-
holders) is potentially higher in family firms. There
have also been a number of studies investigating
the outcomes of family firms, with particular em-
phasis on the effect of family management, family
control, and the characteristics of the family
(Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Dyer,
2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
In this present paper, first, we extend the lit-
erature by questioning whether there is a difference
in risk-taking behavior between family and non-fam-
ily firms in the context of Indonesia. Some previous
studies have empirically examined this particular is-
sue in a different context. In the context of Japan,
Nguyen (2011) finds that control and ownership by
the family are positively related to the behavior in
decision making. Anderson & Reeb (2003) find that
family is not associated with high-risk decisions. Fam-
ily tends to choose the safest way to inherit the busi-
ness to the next generation. Likewise, La Porta et al.
(1999) and Morck & Yeung (2004) show that family-
controlled firms have a tendency to decline risky
decisions. Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) mention that
families do not like the loss due to their socio-emo-
tion to the business. Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer
(2003) show that if the family holds a large propor-
tion of shares, their interest would be in accordance
with the firm’s interest. Thus, the family would take
more risk to lift the firm value. Setiawan et al. (2016),
using Indonesian firms, reveal that family-owned
firms pay a lower dividend. However, they argue
that it is not because the families want to take more
risk by investing retained earnings on risky invest-
ment, rather, they may take benefits by controlling
the resources in the expense of minority (agency prob-
lem type 2). Prabowo (2013), by studying commer-
cial banks in Indonesia, reveals those family-con-
trolled banks, both direct and indirect controls, have
a lower performance than that of non-family banks.
On a different angle, Untoro et al. (2017) show that
past performance is important in the family firms par-
ticularly in the appointment of the following CEO.
Bad performance could imply that non-family mem-
bers may have more chance to be selected as the new
CEO.
Discussing family-controlled firms should also
consider the family involvement in the management
which is usually identified by looking at profiles of
board directors and board of commissioners - in the
dual board system (Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Lin, 2011). In the context of
Indonesia, most of the family firms have involvement
in the board of commissioners. A substantial num-
ber of family-controlled firms also appoint a family
member as the CEO (president director). Jiang & Peng
(2011) reveal that there is a positive impact on firm
performance in Indonesia when the CEO (or called
president director) is a family member.
In this present paper, we also consider that
risk-taking strategy is also influenced by the pro-
files of the board of directors and the board of com-
missioners. Our main interest here is on the pres-
ence of women on the board both in the board of
directors and board of commissioners as it is gen-
erally argued that women are more risk averse in
taking decisions than men. Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer
(1999) exhibit a meta-analysis of 150 studies on risk-
taking behavior and conclude that men are more
involved in risky and more gambling investment
than women. Similarly, Barber & Odean (2001) find
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | FINANCE
Volume 22, Issue 4, October 2018: 606–613
| 608 |
that men have a higher confidence level than women
which is then reflected in the more transactions in
the investment. In the context of corporation, Huang
& Kisgen (2013) document that men are more confi-
dent in financial decisions than women. In the con-
text of Indonesia, Sawitri, Untoro, & Trinugroho
(2016) find that the proportion of women in top
management of banks is negatively associated with
lower performance. Arguably, it is due to the less
risk-taking strategy.
However, some papers provide different re-
sults. Midavaine, Dolfsma, & Aalbers (2016) find that
the existence of women in the board making firms
having more investment in research and develop-
ment which means women is also challenged to take
risky decisions. Similarly, Deaves, Luders, & Luo
(2009) do not find that women are less confident
than men.
It has been generally known that family busi-
ness is a typical business in Asia including Indonesia.
Miller & Le Breton-Miller (2006) distinguish family
control of firms into four types; degree and mode of
family ownership, the leadership of family in the firm,
the involvement of multiple family members, and par-
ticipation of later generations or succession plan.
There have been some empirical studies on
the impact of family control and firm outcomes such
as accounting performance and market value. For
instance, the seminal paper of Anderson & Reeb
(2003) shows that family firms have higher perfor-
mance than non-family firms. Likewise, Lee (2006)
concludes that the revenue of family-controlled firms
is growing over time. Moreover, those firms are
more profitable than non-family firms. In addition,
this study also reveals that founding family involve-
ment is significant in improving firm performance.
Maury (2006) differentiates between active and pas-
sive family control. This study finds that active fam-
ily control has a positive effect on firm performance,
while there is no significant effect on passive family
control. Andres (2008), by using German data, also
finds that family firms are more profitable than
widely-held firms. More recent, Chu (2011), in the
context of Taiwan, find that there is a positive ef-
fect of family ownership on firm performance more
so when the family members involved in the man-
agement. However, some studies find differently,
for instance, Tsao et al. (2009), in which there is no
evidence on the different performance between fam-
ily and non-family firms.
The other interesting issue is regarding the
difference in business strategy between family and
non-family firms, particularly concerning the risk-
taking strategy. Some empirical studies have inves-
tigated the difference in risk-taking behavior be-
tween family and non-family firms. For example,
Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc (2011) demonstrate that
family firms tend to invest less in the high-risk and
R&D projects. Similarly, Chen & Hsu (2009) reveal
that family firms tend to be reluctant in investing in
long-term R&D which is considered to be risky.
Some studies, however, provide different evidence.
Zahra (2005) explains that family ownership and
involvement is positively associated with entrepre-
neurial risk-taking. Naldi et al. (2007) argue that
family firms take the risk especially in entrepreneur-
ial activities; however, the level is lower than non-
family firms. Our focus here is to extend the litera-
ture by empirically studying the effect of family
ownership and involvement on a risk-taking strat-
egy of firms in the context of Indonesia.
The issue of women presence in top manage-
ment, both as top executive and board of director
members has been extensively studies along with
the increase in the proportion of women on corpo-
rate board (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Some studies
conclude that women presence is beneficial for firms
in improving firm performance, e.g., Smith, Smith,
& Verner (2007) and García-Meca, García-Sánchez,
& Martínez-Ferrero (2015). In a meta-analysis study,
Post & Byron (2015) conclude that female board
presence is positively associated with firm perfor-
mance, more so in the countries with greater inves-
tor protections. It could be considered that the posi-
Family Ownership, Women in Top Management, and Risk Taking: Evidence from Indonesia
Novi Widyawati, Irwan Trinugroho, & Wisnu Untoro
| 609 |
tive effect come from the fact that female directors
are more likely to hold advance degree (Hillman,
Cannella-Jr, & Harris, 2002). In addition to the ad-
vance degree that women directors may have, Post
& Byron (2015) argue that female directors may
have strength in market analysis and flexible deci-
sion making process. Nevertheless, some studies find
differently in which female representation in the board
is negatively associated with firm performance
(Darmadi, 2011; Sawitri, Untoro, & Trinugroho, 2016).
A number of papers specifically discuss on the
effect of women presence on corporate risk-taking
based on the generally considered argument that
women are perceived to be more risk-averse than
men (Sawitri, Untoro, & Trinugroho, 2016). It is also
based on some behavioral studies such as Charness
& Gneezy (2012) who conduct an experimental study
consistently demonstrate that women tend to be fi-
nancially risk-averse than men. However, at the
corporate level, the findings are inconclusive. For
instance, Strøm, D’Espallier, & Mersland (2014) find
that in the microfinance institutions, women pres-
ence is negatively associated with default risk. How-
ever, Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff (2016) find that
there is no evidence that female board representa-
tion has an impact on firm risk.
In here, we extend the literature on the de-
terminants of corporate risk-taking behaviors. We
focus on the impact of family ownership and the
presence of women in the top management of the
level of risk-taking of public firms in Indonesia. In-
donesia adopts a two-tier system making the sepa-
ration of the board of commissioners and the board
of directors. The board of directors has a role in
managing the daily operations of the firm; on the
other hand, the board of commissioners plays a role
in monitoring the board of directors in managing
the firms. We expect that the greater the percent-
age of family ownership will lead to less risky cor-
porate decisions, as well as the greater percentage
of women in the board of directors and the board
of commissioners tend to take non-risky decisions.
METHODS
Data is gathered from the annual reports of
336 public firms in Indonesia taken from the website
of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (www.idx.com).
We also go through the website of each firm to check
the consistency of the reported annual reports. Fi-
nancial firms are not included due to their specific
characteristics. This study takes the data over the
2012-2016 periods.
The main explanatory variables are family
ownership and the presence of women in top man-
agement. Family ownership is reflected by two dif-
ferent proxies. First, a dummy variable is employed
to distinguish a family firm (FAM_FIRM), taking the
value of 1 if there is individual stock ownership of
more than 10 percent and 0 otherwise. Second, if
the president director is a member of the family then
it is stated 1 and 0 otherwise (FAM_CEO). The pres-
ence of women in top management is measured by
two proxies, the ratio of women in the board of
directors (WOM_DIR) and the ratio of women in
the board of commissioners (WOM_COMM). Risk-
taking is seen from the volatility of return, stan-
dard deviations of return on assets (SDROA), as in
the previous studies. SDROA is calculated in a three-
period rolling window.
We also include some control variables to ex-
plain the level of risk-taking which are leverage, size,
age and. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total
debt to total assets (LEVERAGE). To measure the
company size, we use the total natural logarithm of
the company’s total asset (SIZE). The age of the com-
pany is the number of years since the company was
established (AGE).
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the proportion of firms in-
cluded in sample for each industry. The classifica-
tion refers to the Jakarta Stock Industrial Classifica-
tion (Jasica) Index following the study of Prabowo
et al. (2014). Table 2 exhibits the descriptive statis-
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tics of each variable. The average of SDROA is 35.5
percent while, the mean of SDROE is 2.4 percent.
32.9 percent are family firms, and 20.5 percent are
led by family members. It means that not all of the
family firms assign family members to be the CEO.
Furthermore, the proportion of female director (13.8
percent) is slightly higher than that of female com-
missioner (11.10 percent).
Table 1. Proportion of Firms Based on Industry
Table 3 presents the regression results using
OLS regression. The first proxy of family control
which is family ownership (FAM_FIRM) has a nega-
tive effect on SDROA which means that family own-
ership is negatively associated with the risk-taking
strategy. Moreover, our result shows that family in-
volves in the management or if the president direc-
tor is a member of the family, the corporate risk-
taking would be lower as shown by the negative and
significant coefficient of SDROA. Turn to the role of
women in the top management on corporate risk-
taking; we find that the existence of female member
in the board of commissioners does not affect risk-
taking neither on SDROA which means that female
commissioner (WOM_COMM) does not affect risk-
taking. On the other hand, the presence of female
directors has a negative and significant effect on
SDROA which means that the more the proportion
of women in the board of directors, the lower the
risk-taking decisions are made in the corporation.
DISCUSSION
Our main finding in this empirical study is that
family ownership and involvement are negatively
correlated with the degree of corporate risk-taking.
It confirms some previous studies such as Anderson
& Reeb (2003) and Morck & Yeung (2004). It is also
in line with the finding of Naldi et al. (2007) which
mention that family firms have less risk-taking com-
pared to non-family firms even though they con-
duct entrepreneurial activities. Family firms are at
some extent perceived as conservative (Sharma,
Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). The negative effect, per-
haps, comes from the fact that family tends to choose
the safest way to inherit the business to the next
generation. Moreover, the finding suggests that fam-
ily participation in the top management has more
effect on the direction and strategy of the firms
rather than appointing outside CEO. Family CEO
would behave in line with the interest of family as a
whole to consider the sustainability of the business
to the next generation (Naldi et al., 2007).
Industry Firms (%) 
Agriculture 5.06 
Mining 10.12 
Basic industry and chemicals 16.07 
Miscellaneous industry 8.93 
Consumer goods industry  8.93 
Property, real estate and construction 12.80 
Infrastructure, utilities, and transportation 11.31 
Trade, service, and investment 26.79 
Total 100 
 Mean Median Max Min Std. 
Dev 
SDROA 0.355 0.024 229.203 0 8.013 
FAM_FIRM 0.329 0 1 0 0.470 
FAM_CEO 0.205 0 1 0 0.404 
WOM_COMM 0.111 0 1 0 0.177 
WOM_DIR 0.138 0 5 0 0.233 
AGE 3.438 3.465 7.608 1.098 0.786 
LEV 0.554 0.483 32.923 0 0.992 
SALES 7.157 0.483 12.214 -2.302 2.005 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3. The Result of OLS Regression
 SDROA 
C 0.192 (7.129)*** 
FAM_FIRM -0.025 (-3.291)*** 
FAM_CEO -0.041 (-4.669)*** 
WOM_COMM 0.011 (0.417) 
WOM_DIR 0.038 (2.522)** 
AGE -0.006 (-1.712)* 
SALES -0.014 (-5.822)*** 
LEV 0.034 (7.419)*** 
Adj. R Square 0.084 
F Statistic 17.67*** 
 Note: t-statistics is in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively
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The second issue here is related to the pres-
ence of women in top management which is found
to have negative on firm risk-taking particularly
when women serve on the board of directors rather
than on the board of commissioners. It may be con-
sidered that the role of women in board of commis-
sioners has a small impact on the organization. To
some extent, these results confirm the most finding
in the previous studies that the presence of women
in the top management is negatively associated with
the degree of corporate risk-taking. This also indi-
cates that any addition of female directors would
expectedly decrease the overall firm risk-taking.
Board of directors, in the context of Indonesia which
is similar to top management team in the single
board system, is responsible for managing the daily
operations of the firms which require high  involve-
ment of the members. Perhaps, this confirms the
postulation of Barber & Odean (2011) and Charness
& Gneezy (2012) that women are basically more cau-
tious and more risk-averse than men.
We conduct some robustness checks for this
study. First, we tested the empirical model using
random effect and fixed effect techniques rather than
OLS regression. Second, we separate the two prox-
ies of family control in different regression models
as some may argue that there is a collinearity prob-
lem between these two measures. The results of our
variables of interest, however, remain consistent.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
Using data of 336 firms over the period of 2012-
2016, we empirically test the impacts of family own-
ership and women presence in the top management
on corporate risk-taking. Our study contributes to in
the debate on the role of women in top management
especially with regard to risk-taking strategy. Our
results reveal that the presence of women is mat-
tered more to decrease corporate risk-taking strat-
egy when they serve in the board of directors rather
than in the board of commissioners. Likewise, we
also find that family ownership and family involve-
ment as the CEO of the firms negatively associated
with corporate risk-taking strategy.
Suggestions
However, we acknowledge that there are three
limitations in this research. First, this study is only
limited to five years. Second, our measure for risk-
taking only relies on the standard deviation of returns.
Future studies may also consider including some other
risk-taking measures such as investment in research
and development. Third, we do not control for the
educational background, expertise and tenure of mem-
bers of the board of directors and board of commis-
sioners as some may argue that the behavior of women
when they serve in the board could be influenced by
their experience and background.
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